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1 Introduction 
1.1 Complex systems and dependability requirements 
Achieving a high degree of dependability (safety, reliability, availability, etc…) has obvious 
human, economic and potentially environmental advantages. In spite of this motivation, such 
a high-minded objective nevertheless represents a genuine challenge when considering 
complex macro-systems, for which intuition and experience are not sufficient to comprehend 
the system in its minute details, while keeping a global understanding of the interaction 
occurring at system level. Possible deviations and interferences between components are 
numerous, while the required data is spread amongst a large number of stakeholders 
involved in the system development and operation. Worse, as systems are becoming more 
and more specialised and dedicated, the availability of existing dependability data describing 
the performance of such systems is limited. This is particularly true for innovative systems, 
for which no accident or incident statistics are available. 
 
Modern transportation systems are good examples of large and complex systems. Due to the 
development of automation, networking, modal transfer and to the general increase of 
transportation speed (for improved mobility), the number of interacting components or 
subsystems has increased drastically over the last 20 years. Several standards and 
recommendations regarding dependability have been developed over the last decades to 
cope with the increasing complexity of transportation systems (Høj and Kröger, 2002). 
Developers of safety critical systems are more and more frequently requested to provide 
system safety assessments to the regulatory authorities, often referred to as "safety case". 
Such formal certification procedures exist for instance in aerospace (EUROCAE/SAE 
aerospace guidelines) and railways (CENELEC railway standards and IEC-61508). In both 
sectors, safety standards exist at the hardware/software level and at systemic level. 
However, while the recommendations at the hardware/software level are quite specific in 
terms of design and performance, systemic recommendations only specify global objectives 
and generic procedures. Given that the most adequate approach to fulfil the safety objectives 
of a system depends on its actual characteristics such as size, complexity, level of 
innovation, etc.,  
systemic standards do not require specific methods or assessment tools.  
 
Safety standards in the transportation sector are virtually all based on a similar philosophy 
(Papadopoulos and Mc Dermid, 1999). Their goal is to provide sound guidelines that help the 
designers to provide procedural and technical evidence of the system compliance with safety 
and reliability recommendations. Procedural evidence is achieved by following specific 
procedures for the system development and safety assessment. Technical evidence is 
obtained through the quantitative demonstration that the engineered system reaches a 
required level of integrity. To fulfil the latter requirement in complex systems, a partitioning in 
sub-systems is usually recommended. Safety and reliability specifications are then allocated 
to the different sub-systems and system components according to the system break-down. 
The developers/suppliers are thus usually bound to demonstrate the compliance of their 
subsystems with these requirements by using specific inductive or deductive analysis 
methods. 
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1.2 Pitfalls in optimising dependability of complex macro-systems  
Complex macro-systems are usually partitioned into smaller sub-systems, the design and 
production of which are distributed to independent suppliers. Global performance 
requirements are broken-down and allocated to the individual subsystem.  
Optimising the dependability of the global system with such project architecture is difficult 
and may lead to a dangerous overestimate of its availability or safety. Numerous challenges 
and pitfalls, of procedural or technical nature, await the system developers. Although the 
common pitfalls of risk assessment are well known (Gadd et al., 2004), avoiding them in the 
context of macro-systems remains difficult. Frameworks have been proposed to optimise, in 
a rational way, the design of such systems (Melchers, 2001; Kââniche et al., 2002; Bate and 
Kelly, 2003). Three pitfalls are of particular relevance in the context of macro-systems: 
o lack of system overview  
o conflicting objectives or unclear distribution of responsibilities between the actors 
involved  
o lack of relevant data to assess the system performances 
 
1.2.1 Lack of overview 
In his review of system design optimisation, Melchers (2001) points out that: (1) the 
optimisation studies are usually focused on a specific part of the system (a subsystem) and 
that, (2) the focus is on technical aspects.  
The focus on independent subsystems is strongly influenced by system boundaries and 
partitioning. The development of each subsystem is assigned to distinct groups or specialists, 
who produce their own safety and reliability data. As each subsystem has its own 
requirement specifications, their respective performances are usually assessed and analysed 
individually. The system overview is then built through the “simple” summing-up of the 
individual sub-system’s performance. Interactions between subsystems (functional 
interaction, common cause factors) being hence neglected, this may lead to serious 
overestimates of the global system performance. 
“Narrowing” the dependability assessment to technical aspects is also a common tendency. 
The influence of the system environment is neglected, which may lead to a significant 
discrepancy between the theoretical and effective performance of the system. This often 
results from a lack of clarity about the respective responsibility boundaries of the actors 
involved (operator, suppliers, authorities), leading to situations where each actor tries to 
restrict as much as possible the scope of its own responsibility, hence implicitly increasing 
that of the others. 
 
1.2.2 Conflicting objectives 
The suppliers/developer and the system’s owner (the customer) have divergent needs and 
objectives. While the suppliers must demonstrate the proficiency of his own subsystem or 
component, the owner’s responsibility is more contextual. He must ensure that the system, in 
its physical and organisational environment, will work as expected. The need for global 
performance indicators is also shared by the Authorities, although their concern is usually 
limited to safety aspects. Understanding each actor’s goals and responsibilities towards risk 
and reliability assessment is of utmost importance because it defines the focus and 
boundaries of their respective work. When these limitations are not perceived, the data 
exchanged between the various actors can be misused. It is for instance the case when, the 
reliability data provided by a supplier, which represents the intrinsic performance or "nominal" 
reliability of his subsystem, is used as such by the customer to assess the global 
performance of the system in its real environment and with its specific operational processes.  
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The case of railway switching points illustrates this pitfall. Considered as critical elements, 
switching points are designed to achieve high levels of safety. This integrity is often achieved 
at the expense of significant maintenance, which proves necessary to ensure an appropriate 
level of system availability. (Marquez et al., 2007). Failure statistics tend to indicate that in-
situ reliability level up to two orders of magnitude below the actual intrinsic reliability indicated 
by the suppliers. This discrepancy can be explained by the fact that external elements such 
as stones from the ballast, snow or chunks of ice falling from the trains are the most common 
cause for the failure of points. Although the intrinsic performance data given by the 
supplier/developer may be correct, it does not reflect the effective failure rate of the switching 
points integrated in the system. Using the suppliers’ value to assess the dependability level 
of the system bears the risk of overestimating the performance of the system considered. 
Distinct objectives in terms of reliability and safety are also a potential source of conflict. 
While authorities and regulations will focus on safety performance, the system operator or 
system owner will also give emphasis on reliability and availability performances in order to 
avoid costly operation losses. Both performances are linked, although computing and 
optimising one of them independently may have adverse effects on the other. In railways, 
Track Vacancy Proving system (TVP) are, for instance, available on track sections. False 
alarm may occur, for instance, because of metallic dust accumulated on the track (in case of 
contact measurement system) or because of small backward wheel motion at low speed (in 
case of wheel counting systems). Should the line operator be "certain" that no train is actually 
occupying the track section, he may (depending on the operational procedures) manually 
override the automatic TVP system. Such a compensating provision has a positive effect on 
the system availability, but reduces in the same time the safety level. 
 
1.2.3 Lack of relevant data  
For maximum efficiency, dependability optimisation should accompany the system along all 
its development stages, starting at the concept phase. However, the common point between 
all innovative systems under development is a recurrent lack of relevant reliability data, which 
renders the dependability analysis intricate. Analysts may well rely on available data (for 
instance coming from test phases), but these statistics usually arrives at a late development 
stage, when major system modifications are no longer possible.  
The situation is hardly better when technical data is available for specific components or 
subsystems prior to the system development; Although this facilitates greatly the setting of 
quantitative values during the dependability analysis process, the figures at disposal do 
rarely consider the real environment and operating conditions of the system, as already 
mentioned above. Therefore, the evaluation of the system performance based on this data 
may significantly differ from the real system performance.  
Considering the above, relying on expert judgments proves always necessary at some stage 
of the development process, either to estimate components/subsystems performance or to 
asses the relevance of the input data used.  
However, the relevance of such expert figures is itself a source of concern. Previous studies 
have proposed recommendations to give a sound basis to expert judgment assessment 
(Hokstad et al., 1998). Mismatching data format and insufficient data on the system’s lifespan 
are the most commonly reported problems. Insufficient lifespan data occurs recurrently in the 
design of new systems, for which no past experience is available.  
 
1.3 Content of the article  
Risk assessment of complex macro-systems in the context of safety certification is discussed 
in this paper. An original functional approach, based on the Failure Modes, Effects and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) method is presented and applied to a railways signalling 
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system. As compared to a classical hardware approach, enriching the model with a functional 
description of the system is thought to overcome some of the pitfalls (lack of overview, 
conflicting objectives) encountered when addressing dependability assessment of complex 
innovative macro-systems. This approach is also expected to provide global and comparative 
performance indicators to highlight further developments priorities and potential 
vulnerabilities.  
1.4 General Approach and requirements 
Inductive and deductive risk analysis (RA) methods have been known and used since the 
seventies to address risks in “sensitive“ processes such as nuclear or chemical plants. The 
well-known Fault-trees (Vesely et al., 1981), Event-trees (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 1975), HAZOP studies (Kletz, 1993), FMEA (European Cooperation for Space 
Standardization., 2001) or even MORT (Johnson, 1980) are now applied in a wide range of 
domains.  
Numerous developments and extensions have been made to cope with the increasing 
complex nature of technical systems and to overcome the limitations encountered with 
manual approaches. Software tools are available today for most classical methods, enabling 
to greatly facilitate data storage, processing and retrieval. Other computer-based methods 
are also available to assess the system’s dynamic performances. This is for instance the 
case with Markov's chains, which can cope with time constraints such as concurrency and 
parallelism encountered in complex systems (Vinod and Vijaya, 1997). These techniques are 
used for instance to model control systems (Betous-Almeida et al. 2002) or complex 
automated systems (Bernard et al. 2008). Nevertheless, such advanced computing 
techniques are mainly used to assess the dynamic performance of systems of known 
behaviour (degraded modes, failure rates, repair rates) rather than to spot unidentified risks 
or vulnerabilities of stochastic nature (Vernez et al., 2003). 
From a methodological point of view, the choice of a suitable methodology for dependability 
assessment depends on the specific goals’ analysis and on the system considered. In 
practice, several other constraints must be taken into account, such as the deadlines, the 
resources available or the deliverables expected from the study. The requirements 
considered as relevant in this study to address innovative and complex macro-systems are 
presented in Table 1Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1 about here 
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From our point of view, the methodology which comes closest to satisfy all of the above 
requirement is a computer-assisted Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). In 
the classical FMECA, the considered system is successively broken down into subsystems 
and components. Failures modes are then induced at components-level in a systematic way. 
The occurrence probability and potential effects at local (component or subsystems 
behaviour) and global levels (system behaviour) are then assessed for each failure mode. 
The purely technical build-up of the FMECA structure is part of the FMECA procedure and 
can be found in literature (US Department of Defense 1980; European Cooperation for 
Space Standardization, 2001). 
Amongst the classical risk analysis techniques, the choice of a failure mode approach proves 
necessary because:  
(1) the requirement for a systematic object/function oriented approach implies the use of 
an inductive methodology,  
(2) it can be quantified based on failure rates of individual components,  
(3) it is widely used and documented and therefore more likely to be accepted by the 
involved actors (suppliers, operator, authorities).  
Furthermore, FMECA appears also to be flexible in the context of a system under 
development. In a top down approach, one can indeed choose freely the appropriate level of 
detail. In particular, additional system layers can be added to the FMECA structure at later 
design stages in order to continuously reflect the status of the system development.  
FMECA also considers a hierarchical system in which "vertical" failure propagation 
predominates. This model of propagation makes sense in large systems, which tend to be 
structured into hierarchical layers. Such a hierarchy exists for instance between the basic 
operating components and components or subsystems dedicated to strategic activities 
(controlling, diagnostic, etc.).  
The choice of a computerized tool is mostly motivated by practical reasons. It allows the 
development of a generic structure which facilitates data implementation at later stages of 
the dependability procedure: update of quantitative data, design changes, addition of new 
components. Moreover, it facilitates criticality computation, data retrieval and data 
processing. The FMECA module of Reliability Workbench (version 9.1, 2001, Isograph Ltd.) 
has been used in this study.  
1.5 Limitation of the classical FMECA  
Several drawbacks of the FMECA have been reported by previous authors. One of these 
concerns the quantification procedure used to achieve a risk priority ranking. An arbitrary 
rating is usually given on the quantitative factors involved: severity, failure probability and 
detection probability. As the rating scales of the various factors are different (linear and non-
linear scales) their multiplication generates coherence problems. Different values of these 
quantitative factors may lead to the same criticality ranking, while the corresponding risks 
may actually differ significantly. Fuzzy or grey reasoning techniques have been developed to 
overcome these limitations (Pillay and Wang, 2003). The fact that in FMEA, the failure 
propagation follows a linear sequence is also a source of concern. It is generally known that 
FMEA cannot cope with consequences specifically caused by complex multiple failures and 
that it does not provide a systematic perspective on risk ranking (Pate-Cornell and al., 2002).  
In a FMECA analysis, each possible failure is considered in turn. The process is time 
consuming and usually produces a large amount of documents. Automated generation of 
FMECA reports have been proposed by previous authors (Price and Taylor, 2002). 
Algorithms to handle both single point and multiple failures have been developed. The 
drawback of this approach is that it only concerns failure modes in direct relation with 
hardware components, for which no interpretation is required. Failures occurring at higher 
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hierarchical levels (operational failure, alarm failure, etc.), of higher abstraction level (system 
does not fulfil the mission for which it has been designed) can hardly be managed in an 
automated way. This may explain why important discrepancies are commonly found between 
theoretical and effective system performance. It is also a limit of the self-certification 
approach, which relies on similar paradigm than automatic FMECA generation tools, to 
provide safe to use equipments. 
The classic FMECA approach, which relies on non-evolving (static) documents (paperwork, 
spreadsheets) is of limited use to support the design (the system safety society, 1997). A 
tedious review of the FMECA documents must be undertaken for any significant change in 
the system architecture or in the design of its components. Thus, although the analysis is 
usually conducted by the supplier itself, he seldom perceives it as a support for decision 
making. This lack of interest from the supplier has been substantiated by Johnson and Khan 
(2003) in their investigation of the perceived benefits from Process-FMEA (PFMEA). Their 
work indicates that the documents produced during the analysis are only considered as a 
mandatory output for the customer, who will use it to sustain the whole dependability 
demonstration. This situation raises concerns about the relevance of the analysis, as well as 
about the output data management and the update. Although classical FMECA has brought 
satisfactory results in the past, the need for more advanced methodologies is necessary 
today to support the safe and reliable design of increasingly large and complex systems.  
1.6 Proposed approach 
1.6.1 Functional approach  
A system may be seen either as a set of components or as a set of functions. Both hardware 
and functional approaches are possible in a FMECA, with various advantages and 
drawbacks. The hardware approach may provide more thorough data, assuming that the 
system is defined at a fair level of detail. In our case, a hardware approach may be for 
instance suitable to depict a specific subsystem (e.g. track equipment), although it is difficult 
to implement on components or subsystems dedicated to abstract tasks (e.g. processors).  
The functional approach is more suitable to model complex layered systems or abstract tasks 
such as processor-based tasks, while its results tend to be less specific. For this reason, this 
approach is often only considered as a preliminary step to be used early in the design phase. 
This point of view is somehow reductive as the “abstract” nature of the functional approach 
actually presents significant advantages over its hardware counterpart: 
 it greatly facilitates the consideration of the system operating environment 
(organisation, procedures, recovery means).  
 it facilitates the system modelling as it allows the breaking-down into hierarchical 
functional blocs.  
The latter property is of particular interest in regards to modularity. The functional blocs can 
be easily re-arranged to take into account design evolutions or modifications, or to be re-
used in similar systems.  
In this study, the system has been modelled following, globally, a functional approach. This 
approach seems of particular interest in the context of complex macro-systems because of 
their multiple functional layers. The higher the hierarchical layer, the more conceptual the 
tasks assigned to the corresponding devices become. In large systems, there is already a 
strong functional hierarchy between systems - subsystems and operating components layers. 
This is for instance the case in railways or aviation, where normal operation functions and 
safety functions (e.g. collision avoidance systems) are usually managed by different 
hierarchical layers (Durou et al., 2002). A strict segregation is also kept between these layers 
in order to avoid concurrencies.  
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Functional system modelling has proven powerful to structure and analyse complex systems. 
An example of the hierarchical functional representation of an automotive lighting system 
may be found in Snooke and Price (1998). It should be pointed out that methods and 
algorithms have been developed to systematise and automatise the functional modelling 
approach. However, such applications seem to be limited to specific components or small-
scale subsystems. An example of automated functional approach for an electrically driven 
gear pump has, for instance, been proposed by Hawkins and Woollons (1998).  
 
 
1.6.2 Hierarchical layering in complex macro-systems  
The construction and use of the hierarchical structure approach is shown in Figure 1. The 
system is successively split into sub-systems until the level of the basis 
functions/components is reached following a top-down approach. The bloc at the top 
represents the global function of the system for which it has been designed (for instance 
“trains performs safely the optimal route” in the case of a railway line). It is interesting to note 
that, in the upper part of the hierarchy, the use of a functional approach leads to a 
significantly different structure from the use of a hardware description. The model reflects the 
expected behaviour of the system. This principle is similar to recent approaches proposed by 
other authors such as the success modelling approach used in Hierarchical Holographic 
Modelling (HHM) to address large hierarchical systems (Haimes et al., 2002), as well as the 
multilevel modelling (MFM) approach used in the Safe-SADT method for instance (Bernard et 
al., 2008).  
 
The upper part of the hierarchy is constituted of generic functions, and it becomes more and 
more specific when moving down along the structure. Choosing the adequate level of detail, 
namely the lowest hierarchical layer to be modelled, is arbitrary and will mostly depend on 
the data available for the quantification. Pursuing the top down logic will eventually lead to 
the level of basic constitutive components (e.g. relays, sensors, valves…). At the component 
level both the functional and the hardware description are equivalent.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 about here  
 
 
 
Failures are induced at the bottom level of the structure and propagated upwards through the 
higher hierarchical layers, until they reach the top level of the hierarchy where they appear as 
macroscopic consequence at the system level. When using “static” spreadsheets to perform 
FMECA, the exploitation and updating of analysis data is difficult. These drawbacks are 
mostly due to the absence of dynamic links between the system hierarchical layers. This 
limitation may be overcome when using a formal top-down description of the system 
hierarchy in combination with dedicated software. Dynamic linking is indeed included in 
recent specialized tools.  
 
It is interesting to note that such functional FMECA requires the successive use of top-down 
and bottom-to-up approaches, respectively to build the hierarchical layers and to propagate 
failures. Expressing the expected behaviour in a top-down process ensures a systemic view 
of the system, while the inductive bottom-up analysis of failure propagation allows a 
systematic quantitative assessment of the risk.  
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1.6.3 Modelling effects of compensating provisions 
Certain failure modes can have compensating provisions, such as redundancies, alarm 
systems or the possibility for the system operator to perform manual corrective actions. 
These provisions can either stop the further propagation of the failure mode and thus prevent 
the occurrence of a dangerous situation at the system level, or reduce the severity of this 
dangerous situation (mitigation measure). Redundancies are a priori integrated directly in the 
description of the basic components. However, when a corrective measure is not included at 
the component level, but is located higher in the system hierarchy, the compensating 
provision is then considered as a dormant element of the system and is modelled in the 
following ways in the FMECA structure (see Figure 2Figure 2): 
• as a compensating provision at the corresponding structural bloc level 
• as a basic building block of the FMECA hierarchy to account for the possible 
dysfunction of this compensating provision (false alarm, erroneous corrective action, 
etc.) 
 
 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
 
 
1.6.4 Multiple failure propagations 
Depending on both the circumstances and the corrective measures possibly taken, certain 
failure modes can propagate on different paths and thus generate different consequences at 
the system level (Figure 3Figure 3). The modelling of corrective actions described above 
enables to account for multiple propagation paths. In this respect, the proposed 
representation of compensating provisions resembles the structure of an Event Tree Analysis 
(ETA).  
This combined approach goes therefore beyond a classical single failure analysis as the 
responses of compensating provisions (alarm systems, corrective actions), together with their 
respective failure probability, are integrated in the model. In other words, the linear accidental 
process involving several independent failures can be considered in this enriched FMECA 
approach, whereas it cannot in the classical FMECA. 
 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
 
1.6.5 Extrinsic failures  
In order for the analysis to reflect the reality of the system in operation, the failure 
identification should not only consider internal technical failures, but should also integrate 
failures caused by external risk factors, such as human failures (direct error or errors due to 
inadequate operational procedures) and environmental hazards. As discussed above, it is of 
utmost importance that the risk analysis be able to consider the system in its real 
environment.  
In this respect, the functional model developed does provide a framework that enables 
external risk factors to be considered. At the level of basic elements, human and 
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environmental hazards can be directly accounted for as individual failure modes and 
apportioned according to their respective probability of occurrence.  
Operational and organisational sources of hazard can also be accounted for thanks to the 
functional description of the system. Normal operations (those operations that are required 
for the system to function properly in a non-degraded mode) appear as basic building block 
of the system hierarchy. Human errors on normal operations can thus be introduced as 
failure modes of these expected actions.  
Human errors occurring on critical actions such as mitigation provisions have to be treated in 
a different way, as these actions do not appear as building block of the system hierarchy. 
The way erroneous compensating provisions have been modelled is described in section 
2.2.2 below. 
 
1.6.6 System boundaries  
The definition of the system boundaries enables to clearly delimit the responsibility of the 
suppliers. Nevertheless, regardless of how complex the system is, its safe and reliable 
functioning often relies as well on other external systems with which it is in interaction. For 
instance the safe flying of an airplane not only depends on the intrinsic functioning of the 
aircraft, it also relies on the data received from the control tower. 
When considering the dependable operation of a system, this interaction with dependant 
neighbouring systems has thus to be considered. The way it is dealt with in the enriched-
FMECA is the following. Two categories of basic building functions have to be considered in 
the FMECA analysis:  
 The basic blocks belonging to the system. These are given comprehensive functional 
descriptions in the FMECA structure: function, failure modes, failure rates, 
apportionment, beta factors, operating time, etc. 
 The basic functions not-belonging to the system, but which have a direct functional 
interaction with it. These functions therefore represent the interfaces with the 
neighbouring systems. The failure modes relative to these external elements are not 
detailed in the analysis, but their generic consequences on the system have 
nevertheless to be considered and propagated through the FMECA structure, 
similarly to a failure mode belonging to the system.  
 
 
1.6.7 Probability, criticality assessment 
The probability p(x) of a direct undesired situation x triggered by the occurrence of a failure 
mode F, also known as criticality number, is given by:  
FFopF txp βαλ=)(   Equ. 1 
where  
 λF is the total failure rate of the element/function considered 
 top is the operation time of this element/function 
 αF is the apportionment of the specific failure mode, that is the conditional probability 
that a given failure mode has occurred, considering the failure of the element/function 
occurred 
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 βF is the β-factor of failure mode F, that is the conditional probability that the 
consequence x will occur considering the failure mode F did occur. 
 
Since the model can consider both multiple propagations and compensating provisions (see 
above), this introduces apportionments and β-factors at intermediate hierarchical levels. 
Therefore, the probability p(x) of the final consequences x at the system level (at the top of 
the FMECA-hierarchy) caused by a given failure mode F is given by:  
 
 
Equ. 2 
 
 
where  
 αF
i is the apportionment of failure mode F at hierarchical level i 
 βF
j is the conditional probability that the effect of failure mode F at hierarchical level j 
propagates further. 
The criticality number (Cr) of the whole system, also called cumulated criticality, is the sum of 
the specific failure mode criticality numbers in the corresponding severity category.  
 
 
 Equ. 3 
 
 
Where m is the number of failure modes in the severity category considered 
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2 Implementation on a large innovative system 
2.1 ETCS L2 : innovative railways signalling and automated system  
The new high-speed railway line of the Lötschberg contains a bi-directional 37-km tunnel 
through the Swiss Alps. Budgeted at 3 billion Euros, this strategic north-south line will absorb 
some 30’000 trains per year, with an operational start-up foreseen in 2007. 
An innovative signalling and automated system is planned for this line. As in any railway 
system, the numerous track equipments must be coordinated in order to absorb a maximal 
traffic, while optimising availability and safety. These tasks are usually performed through 
several hierarchical layers by computers and relay boxes. This complexity has been brought 
a step further in the case of the Lötschberg line because of the recent development of the 
ETCS (European Train Control System) of the second level (ETCS-L2), in which classical 
optical signalling (with trackside optical signals and speed signs) is suppressed and replaced 
by a GSM-radio-transmission to the trains of centrally computed speed profiles. The onboard 
processing systems of the trains then match these speed profiles to their route according to a 
dual odometric system and to their respective characteristics (braking performance, maximal 
speed, etc.).  
Considering that the braking distance of a train running at 200 km/h is about 1.5 km, we 
understand the critical challenge in introducing such a new signalling system, which must 
maximise traffic capacity while ensuring a very high safety level. No commercial ETCS-L2 
lines exist to date, but this technology will be the future European standard for railway traffic 
management. 
The line is composed of a large number of equipments and highly interactive sub-systems of 
various nature (see Figure 4) (electro-mechanical, electrical, infrastructure, hard-/software, 
electro-magnetic) and locations (tracks elements, control centre, embarked systems), most of 
which are still under development. Finally, although this system is largely automated, the 
human and environmental risk factors nevertheless impact in a crucial way on the system 
performances. 
All these aspects make the Lötschberg railway line a highly complex and innovative system. 
Because of the lack of past experience (incidents, statistics on failures and disturbances) 
with the ETCS level 2 signalling system, the dependability demonstration of the Lötschberg 
railway line relies heavily on prospective risk analyses. Such an approach is furthermore 
required by the railways CENELEC standards (e.g. EN50126 and EN 50129) (CENELEC, 
1999, 2000).  
 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
 
 
2.2 System modelling 
2.2.1 Functions and hierarchical layers 
The first step in the risk analysis is to elaborate a functional model of the system, which 
reflects the system considered as a whole. Starting from the top function for which the 
system is designed ("trains follow successively their optimal route"), the system is 
successively broken down into sub functions, until the level of individual element/component 
is reached (see description in section 3.1).  
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When tackling complex systems, it often proves useful to first draw a preliminary functional 
bloc-description of the system before going into the details of its functioning. Such a sketch 
description is illustrated for the Lötschberg railway line in Figure 5, while a portion of the full 
FMECA structure is given in Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 5 about here 
 
 
Figure 6 about here  
 
 
2.2.2 Compensating provisions 
Compensating provisions at component-levels, such as internal redundancies, does not 
appear explicitly in the system description. They are directly included in the quantitative 
assessment of their related failure mode occurrence. Compensating provisions including 
functions of higher hierarchical levels are depicted as such in the model. This is for instance 
the case when a diagnosis is required (human or computer diagnosis). 
 
Consider for instance a Track Vacancy Proving system (TVP), which is the electro-
mechanical trackside element indicating if a track-section is occupied by a train or not. 
Assume the TVP indicates that a given track section is "occupied", whereas it is actually free 
(false-positive alarm). In this case, the track section will appear as "occupied" (marked in red) 
on the remote control monitor of the line operator.  
 
Should the line operator have a good enough reason to believe that the TVP is indeed giving 
a false-positive information (e.g. through direct view on the track, communication with the 
train driver, etc.) and that the track is actually free, he has the authority to remotely reset 
manually the TVP with a critical command to set the track section free. This action avoids the 
TVP failure to propagate at a higher hierarchical level, where the interlocking (the central 
safety system that allows train routes to be established) would have prevented any route 
setting on this track section, resulting in a partial loss of operation at the system level.  
 
Of course, the compensating provision “reset the TVP” also bears its own failure rate, as the 
operator can set free a track which is actually occupied by a train (which explains why this 
reset function is considered as a critical command). An incorrect compensating action (a 
resetting TVP action of an occupied track) must also be considered in the analysis. 
Quantitatively, the success rate of a compensating provision is introduced in the beta factor, 
which describes the probability of success of the compensating provision, considering the 
failure of the TVP has occurred (Figure 7). Beta factors, which may refer to uncommon 
situation, are difficult to quantify because past experience is (fortunately) scarce. When no 
data or expert judgment is available, an error probability is estimated using generic data 
source, such as human error estimates based on cognitive errors theory. 
 
This modelling of the compensating provisions enables to integrate in the analysis the alarm 
systems and the automated/human corrective actions, which is not possible in the classical 
FMECA approach. 
 
 
Figure 7 about here  
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2.2.3 Severity assessment 
The consequences at the system level of failure modes can be detrimental to the system 
itself (loss of operation, damage to equipment) or to the safety (fatal accident, injury, etc.). In 
order to optimise the performances of the system, it is important that availability and safety 
aspects are considered jointly, as required by the CENELEC railway norms. 
 
In this view, two different severity scales have been defined (Table 2), based on both the 
CENELEC norms and on current practices in similar systems. The RAM-scale proposed here 
considers only operation loss, i.e. availability of the system. Damages to equipment, 
measured in financial losses, could be complementarily matched on the same scale. 
 
Since each failure mode has a consequence at system level (Figure 7), this consequence 
can be evaluated both in terms of impact on the availability of the system (A-scale) and in 
terms of damage to humans (s-scale). Each identified failure mode can thus be associated 
with two unrelated severity categories, which enables to consider both availability and safety 
aspects jointly. 
 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 
2.2.4 Multiple propagations 
 
The example of the switching-point not reaching its end-position (Table 3Table 3), illustrates 
perfectly the modelling process of multiple-propagation. This single failure mode can 
generate different consequences, of various degrees of severity and probability, depending 
on the corrective measures undertaken by the operator (distinguished by its apportionment 
α), and by its potential success (β factor). 
 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
 
2.2.5 Interfaces 
The system considered is in direct interaction with neighbouring systems, with which data is 
exchanged (see Figure 4). The system considered is not responsible for the completeness 
and validity of the data/information produced and transmitted from neighbouring systems, but 
it still has to deal with it, even though this information might be erroneous or incomplete. It 
can be differentiated between four different types of interface failures depending on whether 
the information transmitted is necessary for the functioning of the system (expected data) or 
appears as complementary information (unexpected data). The way we have modelled these 
four failure mode categories is described in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Mis en
Police :(Par
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2.3 Input data 
When considering innovative systems such as the ETCS-L2 railway line of the Lötschberg, 
the failure modes identified are difficult to quantify. When the first iteration of the risk analysis 
was performed, many components were under development and operational procedures 
were not well defined at that stage. No statistical data regarding their reliability was thus 
available. Furthermore, failure modes initiated by external stressors, such as environmental 
conditions, natural events, or human actions, are even more difficult to assess. Although 
mandatory, this quantification procedure represents one of the most intricate and crucial 
tasks of the entire analysis process. A lot of effort can be put into the building up a thorough 
model, but this effort will prove vain if the input data is of bad quality or irrelevant. 
 
An iterative data refining approach has been used to tackle this issue. In a first step, all the 
risks identified have been assessed using conservative failure rate data borrowed from 
international database for similar equipment and operations.  
 
While no further refining effort was necessary on those risks that already proved acceptable 
at this stage, a second round of assessment, based on more system-specific data, has been 
performed on those risks that proved unacceptable after the first iteration. In this second 
step, the failure rates have been obtained either from operational statistics on similar 
systems in operation (for operational failures), or from the equipment suppliers (for new 
components), or from railway experts who were specifically asked to provide conservative 
figures. 
 
A third and final iteration has then been conducted for those risks that still proved critical after 
the second step. 2 to 3 railway experts (depending on availability) were asked to provide 
realistic failure rates or occurrence statistics based on their own expert judgement. Should 
the different expert's estimates on a given failure rate differ significantly, then these figures 
and underlying expert arguments would be shared and discussed between the experts until a 
consensus on a final value could be obtained, similarly to what would be done in a Delphi-
type analysis. It is important to mention that the experts who provided data in the second 
iteration, were interviewed again in the final assessment step to refine their own view, which 
is also a procedure typical of a Delphi-study. 
 
It should be noted that these 3 iteration steps have been conducted at different development 
stage of the system, with the third step carried out on the final design. This original approach 
guarantees to always remain on the safe side of the risk assessment by shifting 
progressively from a pessimistic to a realistic view of the system. Furthermore, this iterative 
procedure offers the great advantage to focus only on these risks that still prove critical after 
each assessment step. Not having to worry any longer about those risks that could prove 
acceptable after the first iteration does save a lot of time and effort. 
 
 
2.4 Results 
For each couple “failure mode-consequence at system level” we have evaluated the 
corresponding occurrence probability, as well as the impact severity given by both the 
Availability (A) and Safety (S) rankings. This whole data can thus be represented in two 
criticality matrices, one related to availability and the other related to safety, as shown in 
Figure 8. 219 events with potential consequences at the macro-system level have been 
identified and their individual risk level evaluated.  
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Except for those few undesired events that affect only the safety or the availability of the line, 
all data points in the A-matrix have a corresponding risk in the S-matrix. Furthermore, due to 
possible multiple propagation paths, given data points in the matrix may correspond to a 
single failure mode with multiple consequences at the system level. 
These joint A- and S-risk matrices do not only yield a global view of the risk level of the 
system, but also enable to identify its individual vulnerabilities, since each point is associated 
to a specific failure of a system component. Furthermore, the approach also represents a 
mean to directly compare the global A- and S-performances of the system.  
 
 
Figure 8 about here 
 
 
 
Indicative risk acceptance thresholds are given in both the A- and S-matrices. These 
thresholds have been established on the basis of risk acceptance criteria previously used by 
the Swiss railways (following a GAMAB approach) as well as criteria proposed for similar 
infrastructures (e.g. the French matrix used in the context of safety analysis for the Channel 
tunnel). This has led to the classical definition of zones in the risk matrices in which the risk 
level is considered respectively acceptable, tolerable and intolerable (respectively the white, 
orange and red zones in Figure 8).  
This approach enabled ones to identify which failure modes represent an unacceptable risk 
for the system in terms of either availability or safety. However, it should be stressed that the 
dependability demonstration (i.e. all risks acceptable) represents an ultimate goal of the 
system design, and is not as such the primary focus at an intermediate development stage. 
In this regards, the primary use of the risk matrices during the system development is to spot 
vulnerabilities of the system that require design changes or further process design and serve 
as indicators of how mature the current design is in terms of dependability achievement. 
Figure 8 shows the system performance at an early development stage. The numerous 
unacceptable risks in the highest severity categories reflect the fact that the risk assessment 
at this early stage has been based on conservative failure rate data.  
Measures should then be taken to reduce the vulnerabilities identified on both A- and S- 
matrices, either by reducing their occurrence probability, or by reducing their severity. Our 
systemic and computational approach enables to integrate the proposed technical/procedural 
modifications directly in the model and assess their impact on the overall system. In 
particular, measures taken to increase the safety level often impact negatively on the 
availability of the system, and vice versa. In this sense, the effect of possible compensating 
provisions can be directly compared and their effectiveness in terms of true risk reduction 
assessed. This proved an extremely useful design- and decision-making tool in trading-off 
between availability and safety performances.  
 
Last but not least, reducing the risk associated with individual failures is not sufficient to 
assess the global dependability performance. It should also be shown that the global 
criticality in each severity category is low, and ultimately below the risk acceptable criteria 
given for this severity. This global risk, which is shown by the blue bars in Figure 8 simply 
represents the cumulative criticality, that is the sum of all the individual event probabilities in 
each severity category (see equation 3). Iterative implementation of design refinement (e.g. 
  page 16/32 
compensating provisions) should be carried out until the cumulative criticality point in each 
impact category falls below the acceptance threshold. For the Loetschberg project, three 
iterations have been carried out, respectively in the development phases of concept, system 
requirements and system design. The system showed a significantly improved dependability 
level at each iteration.  
 
2.5 Coverage and limits  
The combination of the top-down (elaboration of the system hierarchy) and bottom-up 
(propagation of the failure modes) FMECA procedures yields a global view of the system, 
while ensuring an adequate level of technical details. In spite of these advantages, this 
approach cannot, on its own, cover all the requirements of the safety and reliability analysis. 
In studying complex systems, certain factors can restrict the application of the FMECA 
approach. In particular, this method is not well suited: (1) to identify hazardous events 
induced by combinations of independent system failures and particular circumstances; (2) to 
describe operation of the system functioning in degraded state. Both these limitations have 
been experienced in our case study on the Loetschberg system. 
Furthermore, Suokas and Pyy (1988) have shown that, in general, the efficiency and 
coverage of any given analysis method is limited, and that a significant number of hazardous 
situations remain undetected when a single approach is used. In order to enhance the 
coverage of the analysis, complementary studies have been performed using the FTA (Fault-
Tree Analysis) and ETA (Event Tree Analysis) methods. These studies have been used to 
investigate specific safety critical scenarios such as “Reversing”, “Crash of the Radio Block 
Center”, “Loss of GSM connection”, “Collision linked to odometric failure”, etc. It must be 
pointed out that ETA and FTA have their own limitations. FTA for instance can cope with 
complex combination of failures but is coverage is limited to a specific, previously known, 
hazardous situation. For this reason, FTA and ETA approaches should be considered as 
complementary, rather than a substitute, to the bottom-up FMECA.  
 
 
3 Conclusions 
An integrated approach, based on a classical Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA), has been developed to perform risk analysis and risk management of large and 
complex innovative systems. This approach is based on a functional rather than hardware 
description of the system, which enables for the  various procedures and operational 
processes to be integrated in the analysis. This is an important value-added feature of the 
method as those operational aspects often prove critical, if not deciding, when optimising 
system performances. 
The classical FMECA method has been enriched with different computational and analysis 
features offering a more realistic modelling than that of classical FMECA, without losing the 
benefits of a systemic approach. In this approach, failure modes may have multiple 
propagation channels, which enables to account in the risk analysis for compensating 
provisions (alarm systems, corrective actions). This feature also enables to go beyond single-
failure analysis (as normally done in classical FMECA), as the possible failure of these 
compensating provisions are also considered, similarly to an Event Tree Analysis. Further 
computational developments are still needed to better integrate the possibility of having 
apportionment at intermediate hierarchical levels to account for the different propagation 
paths. This work was carried out manually in this study. 
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Furthermore, both availability and a safety severity scales have been proposed so that the 
consequences of system of failures (technical or human) can be assessed jointly. The impact 
on the availability performance of the system of any mitigation measures meant to improve 
the system safety can then be directly assessed, and vice versa. This, in turn, enables 
engineers and decision-makers to optimise the system by taking more informed trade-off 
decisions between the safety and reliability performances. 
Some further computational developments are still needed in this direction to allow for a 
better (more automatised) link between analysis and presentation of the results, as no such 
computational tool exists to date. In particular, it would ultimately be very powerful to be able 
to visualise directly the impact of such or such compensating provision or the effect of the 
reliability improvement of any given component on the global availability and safety of the 
system, that is to create a direct link between the evolutionary core data and the 
representation of the risk matrix. 
Finally, being based on a computational structure, this enriched-FMECA approach is both 
modular and flexible allowing for successive implementations of the model, yielding a 
permanent up-to-date view of the system performances all along its development, from 
concept design to operational start-up. This goes in line with the more and more widely 
recognised fact that dependability analyses should start as early as the concept phase of a 
project for maximum (cost and performance) benefits. 
The proposed approach has been implemented on an innovative railway signalling and 
automated system. It did yield a global and joint view of the Availability and Safety 
performances of the system and did successfully highlight existing vulnerabilities in different 
phases of the system development. However, as it is always the case with innovative 
systems, the lack of relevant reliability data proved limiting for assessing certain aspects of 
the system.  
To try and overcome these difficulties, an original iterative approach based on expert 
judgement has been developed, which bears certain similarities with Delphi-type studies in 
which experts are asked to review their own judgement based on the arguments from other 
experts. One further key aspect of this approach is that it enables ones to follow the system 
development while always remaining on the conservative side of the risk assessment. 
Although relatively convincing, this approach would nevertheless necessitate further 
investigation, in particular to guarantee that no risk are under-estimated in the first iteration. 
With regards to the large discrepancies observed between intrinsic and effective reliability of 
existing systems, further developments are required in this field, where expert judgment 
should, to our opinion, play a more important role in such assessment, in particular so far as 
the operational aspects are concerned. 
This study has addressed some of the pitfalls pointed out in the literature (lack of system 
overview, conflicting objectives) and brings some solutions to partly overcome these 
difficulties. The methodology developed in this study proved a promising risk assessment 
(joint evaluation of the dependability performances, identification of vulnerabilities) and risk 
management (impact assessment of mitigation measures) approaches to support the 
development of complex macro-systems. 
  
  
Acknowledgment  
 
We are indebted to the Swiss Federal Railways (SBB) who allowed us to publish the 
application to the Loetschberg Railway line. 
 
  page 18/32 
References  
Bate, I., Kelly, T., 2003. Architectural considerations in the certification of modular systems. Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety 81, 303–324.  
Bernard, V., Cauffriez, L., Renaux, D., 2008. The Safe-SADT method for aiding designers to choose 
and improve dependable architectures for complex automated systems. Reliability Engineering and 
System Safety 93, 179-196. 
Betous-Almeida, C., Kanoun, K. 2004. Dependability  modelling of instrumentation and control 
systems A comparison of competing architectures. Safety Science, 42(5), 457-480 
CENELEC, 1999. Railway Applications – The Specification and Demonstration of Reliability, 
Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS), EN50126. 
CENELEC, 2000. Bahnanwendungen – Sicherheitsrelevante elektronische Systeme für Signaltechnik, 
prEN 50129. 
Durou, O., Godet, V., Mangane, L., Pérarnaud, D., Roques, R., 2002. Hierarchical fault detection, 
isolation and recovery applied to COF and avionics. Acta Astronautica 50, 547–556.  
European Cooperation for Space Standardization, 2001. Failure modes, effects and critically analysis, 
ECSS, Noordwijk. 
Gadd, S.A., Keeley, D.M., Balmforth, H.F., 2004. Pitfalls in risk assessment: examples from the UK. 
Safety Science 42, 841-857. 
Haimes, Y., Kaplan, S., Lambert, J., 2002. Risk filtering, ranking, and Management Framework Using 
Hierarchical Holographic Modeling. Risk Analysis 22, 383-397. 
Hawkins, P.G., Woollons, D.J., 1998. Failure modes and effects analysis of complex engineering 
systems using functional models. Artificial Intelligence in Engineering 12, 375-397. 
Høj, N., Kröger, W., 2002. Risk analyses of transportation on road and railway from a European 
perspective. Safety Science 40, 337-357. 
Hokstad, P., Oien, K., Reinertsen, R., 1998. Recommendations on the use of expert judgment in 
safety and reliability engineering studies: two offshore case studies. Reliability Engineering and 
System Safety 61, 65-76. 
Johnson, W.G., 1980. MORT Safety Assurance Systems, Marcel Dekkern Inc., Basel. 
Johnson, K.G., Khan, M.K., 2003. A study into the use of the process failure mode and effects analysis 
(PFMEA) in the automotive industry in the UK. Journal of Materials Processing Technology 139, 348–
356. 
Kââniche, M., Laprie, J.-C., Blanquart, J.-P., 2002. A framework for dependability engineering of 
critical computing systems. Safety Science 40, 731-752. 
Kletz, T., 1993. HAZOP and HAZAN: identifying and assessing process industry hazards,3
rd
 ed., 
Institution of Chemical Engineers, Rugby. 
Marquez, F.P.D., Weston, P., Roberts, C., 2007. Failure analysis and diagnostics for railways 
trackside equipment. Engineering Failure Analysis 14, 1411-1426. 
Melchers, R.E., 2001. Rational optimization of reliability and safety policies. Reliability Engineering and 
System Safety 73, 263-268. 
Papadopoulos, Y., McDermid, J.A., 1999. The potential for a generic approach to certification of safety 
critical systems in the transportation sector. Reliability Engineering and Systems Safety 63, 47–66. 
Pate-Cornell, E., 2002. Finding and fixing system weaknesses: probabilistic methods and application 
of engineering risk analysis. Risk Analysis 22, 319-334. 
Pillay, A., Wang, J., 2003. Modified failure mode and effects analysis using approximate reasoning. 
Reliability Engineering and Systems Safety 79, 69-85. 
Price, C.J., Taylor, N.S., 2002. Automated multiple failure FMEA. Reliability Engineering and Systems 
Safety 76, 1-10. 
Snooke, N., Price, C., 1998. Hierarchical functional reasoning. Knowledge-Based Systems 11, 301–
  page 19/32 
309. 
Suokas, J., Pyy, P., 1988. Evaluation of Four Hazard Identification Methods with Event Descriptions, 
Technical Research Centre of Finland, Espoo. 
The System Safety Society, 1997. System Safety Analysis Handbook, 2
nd
 ed, System Safety Society, 
Albuquerque NM. 
US Department of Defense, 1980. Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis, MIL-STD-1629A . 
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975. Accident Definition and Use for Event Trees, National 
Technical Information Service, Springfield. 
Vernez D., Buchs D., Pierrehumbert G., 2003. Perspectives in the use of coloured Petri nets for risk 
analysis and accident modelling. Safety Sciences 41, 445-463. 
Vesely, W. E., Goldberg, F. F., Roberts, N. H., Haasl, D. F., 1981. Fault Tree Handbook, National 
Technical Information Service, Springfield. 
Vinod, C., Vijaya, K., 1997. Reliability and safety analysis of fault tolerant and fail safe node for use in 
a railway signalling system. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 57, 177-183. 
 
 
  page 20/32 
Figure legends  
 
 
Table 1. Methodological Requirements  
Figure 1. Nature of the blocs at different level of the hierarchical model 
Figure 2. Modelling of compensating provisions  
Figure 3. Multiple propagation paths are accounted for in the Enriched-FMECA method  
Figure 4. Signalling and automated system, together with its neighbouring systems. 
Figure 5. Synthetic FMECA hierarchy for the Lötschberg railway line.   
Figure 6. Portion of the full FMECA structure. It contains 141 blocks; amongst which 92 represent 
basic building functions, for which a total of about 230 failure modes have been identified. 
Figure 7. Modelling of compensating provisions (alarm systems and corrective actions). 
Table 2. Severity scales A and S for the joint evaluation of the availability and safety aspects of 
hazardous situations. 
Table 3. Example of multiple propagation. 
Table 4. Possible data transmission failures at the system interface. 
Figure 8. A- and S-risk matrix of the Lötschberg railway line at an early development stage. 219 
events with potential consequences at the marcro-system level were identified and their risk level 
evaluated. The red zone represents unacceptable risks, while the orange patches define the ALARP 
zone of the LBL project 
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Tables  
 
 
Method requirement  Objective  
allow a systematic analysis of the deviations and 
potential hazards 
Meet the requirements of normative standards dependability 
in a complex system (railroad, nuclear,…)  
allow a quantification of the risks Meet the requirements of normative standards dependability 
in a complex system (railroad, nuclear,…) 
be generic facilitate data storage, use and retrieval  
enable an inductive analysis by elements or by functions 
of the system considered 
meet the "systematic analysis" requirement while ensuring 
compatibility with the system partitioning  
be standardised and/or be internationally recognised facilitate acceptance from authorities and coordination with 
suppliers/developers  
to consider jointly availability and safety aspects Meet the requirements of normative standard dependability 
in a complex system (railroad, nuclear,…), avoid the 
"conflicting objectives" pitfall 
be modular and extendable to neighbouring systems avoid the "lack of overview" pitfall 
be systemic, 
o to yield a global view of the system,  
o to integrate the technical, human and operational 
aspects. 
 
avoid the "lack of overview" pitfall, 
avoid the "conflicting objectives" pitfall 
Table 1. Methodological Requirements  
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Severity Class A-damages S-damages 
Catastrophic 6 N/A Irreversible collective damage 
Critical 5 Total operation loss (days) Irreversible individual damage 
Important 4 Total operation loss (hours) Reversible collective damage, major 
comfort loss 
Significant 3 Total operation loss (minutes) 
Partial operation loss (days) 
Reversible individual damage 
Limited 2 Partial operation loss (hours) Minor collective comfort loss 
Negligible 1 Partial operation loss (minutes) N/A 
 
Table 2. Severity scales A and S for the joint evaluation of the availability and safety aspects of 
hazardous situations. 
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Failure mode Compensating measure α factor β factor Consequence Severity 
 
 
 
Point does not 
reach its final 
position 
Operator manages to lock the point by 
repeated backwards - forwards 
movements 
20% 0 None (failure does not 
propagate further) 
 
Operator does not create a route on this 
point and introduces a blocked section on 
the corresponding track. 
10% 1 Partial operating loss Limited 
Operator allows trains to pass at a 
reduced speed (10 km/h) on the point 
69.9% 0.005 Derailment at reduced 
speed 
Critical 
Operator allows trains to pass at a normal 
full speed on the point 
0.1% 0.02 Derailment at full 
speed 
Catastrophic 
Table 3. Example of multiple failure propagation. 
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n° Situation  System's reaction  Example in ETCS Modelling 
1 The interface 
transmits erroneous 
expected data 
 
The system normally has 
a means to check validity, 
or at least plausibility, and 
completeness of such 
data. 
The system validates the train 
data (max speed, braking 
coefficient, etc.) introduced by 
the train driver and which is 
used by the system to 
compute the train dynamic 
speed profiles. 
The failure is propagated throughout the FMECA 
structure as the erroneous data has a direct 
influence on the functioning of the system.  
The possible failure of the data validating process is 
also considered. 
2 The interface does 
not transmit 
expected data 
The system always 
realises that expected 
data has not been 
received 
A train does not receive its 
speed profile via the GSM 
transmission system 
 
The disturbance will be directly propagated to the 
summit of the FMECA hierarchy as no 
compensating provision is normally possible. 
However, in certain cases, default data can be used 
by the system, which will minimise the 
consequences. 
3 The interface does 
not transmit  
complementary 
(unexpected) 
information. 
The system has no means 
to check that such data 
has not been received  
This is for instance the case 
for all the alarm systems 
which are external to the 
system considered, e.g. 
undetected flood in the tunnel. 
The system cannot compensate for non-received 
unexpected information (no compensating 
provision). The consequences will therefore directly 
occur at the system level (summit of the FMECA 
hierarchy) 
4 The interface 
transmits erroneous 
complementary 
(unexpected) 
information. 
The system has normally 
no means to check that 
the content of such data is 
erroneous, and will thus 
consider the information 
as correct. 
This is for instance the case 
for all the fake alarms 
transmitted by external alarm 
systems, e.g. fake fire alarm in 
the tunnel. 
Depending on the system's architecture, it either 
can, or cannot, check the validity of the alarm. If it 
can, then the failure propagates throughout the 
FMECA structure by considering the compensating 
provision and its possible own failure.  
If it cannot, then the failure generates direct 
consequences at the system level, without possible 
corrective action. 
 
Table 4. Possible data transmission failures at the system interface. 
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Figures  
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Figure 1. Nature of the blocks at different levels of the hierarchical model 
Global functions (mission of the system) 
e.g. the whole system performs its mission 
as expected  
Safety functions / corrective actions  
e.g. correct response from the safety 
system/procedures  
Control/command functions  
e.g. correct response from 
detection/controlling systems 
Basic operational functions   
e.g. correct behavior of components, 
data programming etc. F
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Figure 2. Modelling of compensating provisions  
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Figure 3. Multiple propagation paths are accounted for in the Enriched-FMECA method  
Consequence 1 
at system level 
(=SEVERITY)
Failure modes 
(=HAZARD)
Consequence 2 
at system level 
(=SEVERITY)
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Loetschberg System
Control centers
Neighbour networks
Interlocking
(safety functions)
Interlockings
Neighbour networks
Onboard Unit
Radio Block
Center
Control center
Automatic and safety functions
Automatic functions
ProSurf
Real time info
on schedules
Track Vacancy
Proving System
Switching points
GSM-RTrackside
Balises
 
 
Figure 4. Signalling and automated system, together with its neighbouring systems. 
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Neighbour TCS
Automated Route Setting
Status of the global trafficStatus of the global traffic
Collection of route information Collection of route information 
Interlocking
Train Control System (TCS)
Status of the local trafficStatus of the local traffic
Status of routes in neighbouring networksStatus of routes in neighbouring networks
Interlocking
Radio Block Center
Route securingRoute securing
Computing of the
Static Speed Profile
Computing of the
Static Speed Profile
On-board CPU
Computing of the 
Dynamic Speed Profile 
Computing of the 
Dynamic Speed Profile 
Train & Driver
Optimal route is successfully followedOptimal route is successfully followed
TVP, Points, level crossings
Route preparationRoute preparation
= Functions
= Equipment
......
Automated route selectionAutomated route selection
Route Adaptation System
Static train
positioning
Static train
positioning
Balise Transmission Unit
Route triggering system
Entrance in track sectionEntrance in track section
Sending of MA to 
the train
Sending of MA to 
the train
GSM-System
Indication of
Train position
Indication of
Train position
Trackside balises
Status of the tunnel & trackStatus of the tunnel & track
Tunnel alarm systems
Computing of the train 
position
Computing of the train 
position
Dynamic train
positioning
Dynamic train
positioning
Odometry
On-board CPU
Line Operator
Manual routing & 
critical commands
Manual routing & 
critical commands
 
 
 
Figure 5. Synthetic FMECA hierarchy for the Lötschberg railway line.   
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FMECA:0:Train performs the optimal route
1:Train driver follows properly the set route
2:Train is able to perform the set route
1.1:Powerless sections are correcly managed by the train driver
1.2:Train driver has selected the proper onboard ETCS mode
1.3:Train driver has departed in the correct direction
1.4:Train driver respects the dynamic speed profile
2.1:Electro-mechanical functions of the train work properly
2.2:Eurocab MMI works properly
2.3:Interface Eurocab-Locomotiv (DX) works properly
2.4:Onboard equipment knows the exact train position
2.4.1:Data coming from balise is received and understood by onboard equipement
2.4.1.1:Data coming from balise is understood by onboard equipment
2.4.1.2:Balise Transmission Module (BTL) works properly
Failure
modes
Failure
propagation
System
Structurure
elaboration
End
Effects
 
 
Figure 6. Portion of the full FMECA structure. It contains 141 blocks; amongst which 92 represent 
basic building functions, for which a total of about 230 failure modes have been identified. 
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β=0.1 (Reset of TVP by Operator in 90% of the cases)
Traffic runs optimally
Correct train routing is performed
  Train Vacancy Proving (TVP)  system works correctly 
TVP systems erroneously indicate a track section as occupied
Route cannot be established on this track section
A route on an occupied track section is established
β=1
  Operator does not execute erroneous reset of a TVP 
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Figure 7. Modelling of compensating provisions (alarm systems and corrective actions). 
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Figure 8. Availability- and Safety-risk matrix of the Lötschberg railway line at an early development 
stage.  
Availability Severity class (A- matrix) 
Safety Severity class (S – matrix) 
